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The design of bank loan syndicates 
in Emerging Markets Economies 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We empirically explore the influence of loan characteristics, banking and 
financial structure, and regulatory and institutional factors on the design of 10,930 bank 
loan syndicates in emerging market economies from 1990 to 2006. Our results show that 
the structure of syndicates is adapted to enhance monitoring of the borrower and to 
increase the efficiency of re-contracting process in case of borrower's distress. Main 
syndication motives, such as loans portfolio diversification, regulatory pressure and 
management costs reduction, influence syndicate design in emerging markets economies. 
 
JEL Codes : G21, C25. 
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1.  Introduction 
What are the determinants of bank loan syndicates’ design (measured in terms of 
number of lenders and of arrangers) in emerging markets economies (EME)? The 
syndicate design might be different in EME and can therefore have important 
implications for the functioning and the development of syndicated loan markets, and 
more broadly for the financial and economic development of EME. As these economies 
are more fragile, a better knowledge of the determinants of bank loan syndicates provides 
timely policy recommendations on how to encourage the development of syndicated 
lending in these markets. This article is the first empirical research investigating the 
design of bank loan syndicates using loan and country level variables for 10,930 loan 
facilities to borrowers from emerging markets over the 1990-2006 period. 
Already in 1991, syndicated loans represented 67% of all emerging market 
corporate and sovereign borrowers’ financing, twice the amount of total bond and equity 
financing (Altunbas et al., 2006). Furthermore, in the last decade the volume of 
syndicated loans in emerging markets has considerably grown from 91.8 billion USD in 
1995 to 379.8 billion USD in 20051. During that period, the number of issues increased 
from 791 in 1995 to 1124 in 2005. Currently, syndicated loans represent an important 
source of external finance in emerging markets, comparable to bond markets and often 
larger than equity markets (Nini, 2004). In 2005, syndicated lending corresponds to more 
than 11% of the private credit of financial institutions in Singapore, almost 23% in 
Mexico and close to 36% in the Russian Federation2. However, following the Asian crisis 
                                                 
1 These figures are based on computations from the author on the Dealscan database.  
2 These figures are based on computations from the author, with figures on syndicated loans from the 
Dealscan database and with figures for the private credit by financial institutions from Beck et al. (2000). 
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in 1997, the emerging markets were strongly deprived of syndicated lending. 
Furthermore, syndicated loans in IMF-assisted countries exhibit specific features. A 
significant fraction of these funds are used for export industry financing which places 
these sectors at a disadvantage in the export markets. In addition, a significant portion of 
syndicated loans (more than 25%) are granted to financial institutions. These loans are 
usually large but more costly, with high spreads, and have short maturity. 
Briefly, bank loan syndication can be considered as a sequential process, which 
can be separated into three phases3. During the pre-mandated phase, the borrower solicits 
competitive offers to arrange and manage the syndication with one or more banks. From 
the proposals it receives, the borrower chooses one or more arrangers that are mandated 
to form a syndicate4, and negotiates a preliminary loan agreement.  During the post-
mandated phase, the arranger begins the syndication process, which involves drafting a 
preliminary loan contract and preparing a documentation package for the potential 
syndicate members, called an information memorandum, containing information about 
borrower creditworthiness and the loan terms. A roadshow is then organized to present 
and discuss the content of the memorandum, as well as to announce closing fees and to 
establish a timetable for commitments and closing.  After the roadshow, the arranger 
makes formal invitations to potential participants and determines the allocation given to 
each participant. The third and last phase takes place after completion. The loan becomes 
operational, binding the borrower and the syndicate members by the debt contract. 
                                                 
3  See Esty (2001) for a detailed analysis of syndication. 
4 The syndication can be sole or joint mandated, the latter involving the participation of more than one lead 
bank. Such syndications are usually chosen by the borrower in order to maximize the likelihood of a 
successful syndication. The arranger is responsible for the negotiation of key loan terms with the borrower. 
It acts as the syndicate’s agent, which involves such tasks as funds administration, interests’ calculation, 
and covenants enforcement. 
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 A syndicated loan has several advantages that motivate the lenders. It allows to 
diversify loan portfolios and thus to avoid excessive single-name exposure in compliance 
with the regulatory limits while maintaining a relationship with the borrower, it helps to 
exploit comparative advantages of syndicate members in terms of financing and 
eventually in terms of information sharing and it allows also diversifying income sources 
through the collection of fees. While these advantages mostly apply to senior syndicate 
members, lack of origination capability and cutting down origination costs are main 
advantages for junior participants. These can also benefit from the know-how transfer 
between members  (Tykvova, 2007)5.  
Loan syndication has also several drawbacks as it generates potential agency 
problems due to informational frictions between the senior and the junior members of the 
syndicate. Following Diamond (1984), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Gorton and 
Pennachi (1995), borrower monitoring by multiple creditors may lead to cost inefficiency 
and free-riding. Hence, creditors usually delegate monitoring to one financial 
intermediary, the arranger, who acts as the syndication agent. As his monitoring effort is 
unobservable, the syndicate faces a moral hazard problem. Additionally, the arranger 
collects private information through due diligence or through a previous lending 
relationship. If this information cannot be credibly communicated to the participants, an 
adverse selection problem arises as the arranger may syndicate loans with the less 
favorable information. Finally, handling borrower’s financial distress is more 
                                                 
5 Borrowers can also gain advantages from syndication (Allen, 1990; Altunbas et al., 2006): ability to 
arrange cross border transactions, restriction of negotiation with one bank, uniform terms and conditions, 
more competitive pricing resulting in lower spreads, lower fees compared to bond issues, more flexible 
funding structure, larger amount compared to public finance, and speed and discretion of arranging the 
deal. 
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complicated in a syndicate setting because lenders must reach a collective decision. The 
outcome of negotiations in debt restructurings are affected by the number of creditors, by 
the allocation of security among the set of creditors, and by the character of stringency of 
the voting rules among the creditors (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996). 
The advantages of syndicated loans for banks and borrowers show that they 
provide an important financing vehicle for emerging markets and thus for their economic 
development as they contribute to enhance the sources of external finance in these 
countries. Moreover, if syndicated loans reduce the cost of borrowed funds, they also 
contribute to favor the financing of companies. The expansion of syndicated loans 
increases the diversification possibilities for banks in terms of risk and income, which 
decreases the likelihood of bank failures. As a consequence, the expansion of syndicated 
loans contributes to financial stability, which is a fundamental issue for emerging 
economies. 
While these benefits are especially important for emerging markets finance, the 
agency problems related to syndications can have severe consequences for the financial 
stability of these markets. A crucial input to mitigate these problems is the structure of 
the syndicates that, if adapted, can reduce agency costs related to the syndication process. 
Therefore, empirical investigation of the factors that influence the size and the 
composition of syndicates in emerging markets is an important and timely issue. 
 Academic literature investigating the structure of bank syndicates remains 
relatively scarce. The first empirical research on syndicate size and composition was 
performed by Lee and Mullineux (2004), showing that syndicates on the US market are 
structured to enhance monitoring efforts and to facilitate renegotiation. Jones et al. (2005) 
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and Sufi (2007) show that the lead bank retains larger share of the loan and forms a more 
concentrated syndicate when the borrower requires more intense monitoring and due 
diligence. Finally, François and Missonier-Piera (2007) empirically explore the motives 
for delegating administrative tasks (e.g.: issuing the legal documents, or holding the 
collateral) to specialized co-agents. 
Contrary to the US syndication market, evidence regarding the structure of 
syndicates is very scarce for emerging market economies. The investigated issues are 
rather the determinants of syndicated loan pricing in developing countries (Altunbas et 
al., 2006) and the participation of local banks in syndications (Nini, 2004). Therefore, the 
first objective of this work is to test if the same factors as in industrialized markets (along 
the lines of Lee and Mullineux, 2004) influence syndicates in emerging economies. 
Furthermore, as the loan contract characteristics are definitely richer we also investigate 
the impact of such features as covenants, guarantors and sponsors on the syndicate 
structure. Finally, we also investigate the impact of banking and financial structure, 
regulatory environment and legal risk on the syndicate design. 
 The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the tested 
determinants of the syndicate structure. Section 3 presents data, methodology and 
variables, and section 4 displays the results. We conclude and provide further research 
perspectives in section 5. 
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2. Determinants of bank syndicate design 
2.1 Syndicate design and agency problems 
This paper investigates the factors that influence syndicate design and analyzes if 
that design is a response to the specific potential agency problems generated by bank loan 
syndication. Syndicate design is measured with total syndicate size (Number of Lenders) 
and with the number of senior syndicate members (Number of Arrangers). We make this 
distinction because senior members of the syndicate have different concerns and 
motivations compared to other participants. Therefore, the influence of the same factors 
can differ in terms of sign and significance depending on the status of the lender in the 
hierarchy of the syndicate6. 
As mentioned in the introduction, syndicated loans present certain benefits and 
costs which influence their use. Namely, banks may expect benefits from syndicated 
loans through the diversification of loan portfolios and of sources of income with fee 
income obtained, the enforcement of the lending limits, and the possibility for some 
banks suffering from a lack of origination capacities in certain types of transactions to 
participate to certain types of loans. 
However, syndicated loans generate two specific agency problems. First, private 
information about the borrower creates an adverse selection problem, as the arranger may 
be inclined to syndicate loans from bad borrowers7. Second, the participant banks 
                                                 
6 In order to avoid biased results, we do not distinguish the number of participants, as the same financial 
institution can have several roles in a syndicate being simultaneously an arranger and a participant, which 
involves senior and junior status. 
7 However, such opportunistic behavior generates reputation risk for the arranger and affects negatively the 
success of future syndications (Pichler and Wilhelm, 2001). 
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delegate monitoring tasks to the arranger whose efforts are unobservable for participant 
banks, which results in a moral hazard problem8. 
The structure of a syndicate can be viewed as an organizational response to these 
problems (Pichler and Wilhelm, 2001). The arranger has concerns about the monitoring 
efforts of participants and can consequently influence the size and the composition of the 
syndicate which involve explicit and implicit costs / revenues tradeoff. It decides on the 
institutions it will invite to participate, chooses the initial menu of designated amounts for 
participation, the dollar size of each bracket, and the associated fees for each bracket. It 
also reserves the right to close the syndication at any time prior to the designated end of 
the offering period.  
In order to provide a credible signal about the borrower’s quality and to align 
monitoring incentives, the arranger can adjust its own portion of the loan (Jones et al., 
2005; Sufi, 2007). This can be achieved by forming a smaller syndicate and/or a smaller 
syndicate “core” with few arrangers. Smaller syndicates allow arrangers to minimize the 
management costs of a group lending process, to prevent free-riding, and to resolve 
borrower’s financial distress problems more efficiently. However, large syndicates might 
allow exploiting scale economies. Seeking to develop or maintain reputation through 
reciprocity and repeat dealing is also a potential argument to form larger syndicates. 
Enhancing fee income could also be achieved by forming a larger syndicate with small 
proportional holdings for each member. 
In summary, the factors that influence the syndicate structure are expected to be 
those that banks, and especially the arranger, believe will modify the benefits and costs of 
                                                 
8 Nonetheless, the arranger has less incentive to monitor the borrower than if it were to lend the full amount 
of the loan (Pennacchi, 1988). 
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syndication. These factors are loan characteristics but they can also be country-level 
variables taking banking regulation, financial development and institutional framework 
into account. 
2.2 Loan characteristics 
We first test the role of several loan characteristics that might impact the structure 
of the syndicate in terms of number of lenders and number of arrangers. Increased loan 
size (Loan Size) is expected to be positively related to syndicate structure. Indeed, the 
motives to diversify loan portfolios and to be in accordance with regulation are more 
likely to play a role for larger loans and thus implying more lenders within the syndicate. 
Maturity of the loan (Maturity) is also considered, although whether it plays a 
positive or negative role is ambiguous. Greater maturity is associated with greater 
monitoring costs as long-term loans incur control of collateral and covenant costs. As a 
consequence, the moral hazard problem involved in syndicated loans is enhanced and 
therefore implies a smaller syndicate and/or a larger “core” of arrangers. Also, if we 
consider a positive relationship between maturity and credit risk (Flannery, 1986; 
Agbanzo et al., 1998), syndicates should be smaller and/or the number of arrangers 
should be larger to enhance monitoring efforts and prevent free-riding, as well as to 
resolve potential borrower distress more efficiently. However, if credit risk and maturity 
are negatively related (Dennis et al., 2000), syndicates should be larger and/or the number 
of arrangers should be smaller. 
We also test several characteristics that provide lenders with better protection in 
case of loan default and thus reduce loan loss. Such characteristics are expected to exert a 
role on the syndicate structure mainly through their impact on potential agency problems. 
- 11 -  
Our first idea was to consider the presence of collateral in the loan agreement 
through a dummy variable equal to one if the loan is secured. However, since information 
on the presence of collateral is strongly missing, its inclusion in the estimations would 
have considerably reduced our sample9. We instead take the presence of guarantors in the 
loan agreement into account, with a dummy variable equal to one if at least one guarantor 
exists (Guarantors). A guarantor gives additional protection for the lenders, as the 
guarantor will honor a part or the totality of the claim in case of loan default. Therefore, 
the presence of a guarantor mitigates agency problems resulting from adverse selection in 
line with the better information owned by the arranger on the borrower. However, 
empirical literature on the role of collateral in loan contracts provides evidence in favor 
of the “observed-risk hypothesis” according to which banks would be able to sort 
borrowers from information they have on their quality (Berger and Udell, 1990; Jimenez 
and Saurina, 2004). As a consequence, banks would ask more protection schemes from 
riskier borrowers. Accordingly, the presence of a guarantor may signal a riskier loan and, 
consequently, a loan plagued by greater agency problems. Smaller syndicates and/or 
larger syndicates “core” would promote more effective monitoring, also avoiding 
duplicative monitoring of the collateral, and more efficient loan restructuring in the event 
of borrower distress. 
 Additionally, we include a dummy variable (Sponsors) equal to one if the loan is 
sponsored. A sponsor is usually an individual capital investor who is involved in the 
project and might also act as an advisor and eventually as an additional monitor of the 
                                                 
9 Results from estimations with this variable on a reduced sample are very similar to the ones obtained with 
the alternative proxy for collateralisation. Therefore, we adopt the latter proxy in order to benefit of a larger 
sample size. 
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borrower. Therefore, the presence of a sponsor should be positively related to syndicate 
size and/or negatively to the number of arrangers. 
We also take debt seniority into account through a dummy variable (Senior Debt) 
equal to one if the debt is senior. Although debt seniority constitutes an additional 
protection for the lenders in the case of loan default, its impact is ambiguous similarly to 
Guarantors. If it works as an effective protection for all the lenders, syndicates and 
number of arrangers should be smaller. But if the seniority does not apply equally to all 
syndicate members, its influence can be significant for the number of arrangers only. 
Similarly, the “observed-risk hypothesis” also suggests a negative impact of this variable 
on the number of lenders and eventually a positive one on the number of arrangers, as the 
request for seniority may result from the perception of a higher risk of the borrower. 
The presence of covenants, which aim at restricting the discretionary power of the 
borrower, is taken into account with a dummy variable (Covenants) equal to one if the 
loan agreement includes covenants. Therefore, the presence of covenants in a loan 
agreement is expected to reduce the risk of loan default (Rajan and Winton, 1995), and 
enhance the ability to monitor the borrower, thereby reducing the monitoring costs. It 
appears that covenants should favor larger syndicates and/or a smaller number of 
arrangers as they reduce potential agency problems from moral hazard behavior of 
member banks during the monitoring process. However, empirical evidence tends to 
show the opposite: a positive link between the presence of covenants and the probability 
of default of the borrower (e.g. Foster et al., 1998). This is in accordance with the 
“observed-risk hypothesis”, where riskier borrowers are offered more binding loan 
agreements. Therefore, arguments exist for both a positive and negative relationship. 
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To account for the impact of publicly available information on syndicate 
structure, we include in our regressions a dummy variable (S&P Rating) equal to one if a 
Standard and Poor’s senior debt rating is available. We expect a positive coefficient since 
the existence of a rating mitigates the adverse selection problem and therefore allows to 
form a larger syndicate and/or a reduced syndicate “core” with few arrangers. 
Borrower’s market presence is proxied through a variable (Borrower Presence) 
equal to the occurrence of a particular borrower in the sample10. Although this variable is 
contingent on the available data within the sample, it gives a broad indication of the 
borrower’s presence on the international syndicated lending and therefore his reputation. 
We expect a positive coefficient for this variable as a lending to a more present and 
reputable borrower should involve less informational frictions within the syndicate 
compared to a new or less present borrower. 
We also control for the type (Term Loan, Revolving Bank Facility) and the 
purpose (General Corporate, Debt Repayment, Project Finance, Working Capital) of the 
loan through the inclusion of dummy variables11. Finally, dummy variables taking 
benchmark rate (Libor and Euribor), facility issue year, year, region and industry are 
included in the regressions. 
2.3 Country-level variables 
We now turn to country-level variables that may influence the design of a 
syndicate. Indeed, Esty and Megginson (2003) have pointed out that institutional factors 
might influence the syndication process in emerging markets. Therefore, we also test the 
                                                 
10 Bharath et al. (2006) construct similar indicators to investigate the benefits of lending relationships for 
the banks. 
11 We do not provide variables for other types and purposes in our regressions, since they represent less 
than 5% of our sample. 
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role of the legal environment, financial development, and banking regulation on 
syndicate structure. 
Our first category of country-level variables examines the role of banking 
structure. Overheads, the ratio of banking overhead costs to total banking assets, 
measures cost inefficiency of a banking industry. Since syndicated loans imply the 
sharing of administration and origination costs, cost inefficiency is expected to encourage 
the formation of larger syndicates, both in terms of total number of lenders and arrangers. 
Consequently, we expect a positive coefficient for this variable. Concentration, defined 
as the assets of the three largest banks as a share of all bank assets, proxies market 
structure of the banking industry. Several arguments imply a negative influence that this 
variable should have on the syndicate size. First, a greater concentration means a lower 
number of potential participants to join a syndicate. Second, banks with greater market 
shares in a banking industry already benefit from diversified loan portfolios and have 
little incentive to diversify further. Finally, the motivation provided by increased revenue 
from syndicated loans should exert a lower impact for banks with greater profitability, 
generally due to stronger market power. 
We also add three variables that take the development of financial markets into 
account. Stock Markets, defined as the value of listed shares to GDP, measures the 
development of stock markets. The expected sign of this variable is ambiguous. Allen 
and Gottesman (2006) have shown that stock markets and syndicated loan markets are 
highly integrated enabling information flow among markets. The development of stock 
markets contributes to information disclosure, which mitigates the adverse selection 
problem resulting from the private information owned by the lead bank on the borrower. 
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We should thus observe a positive coefficient for this variable. However one may also 
consider that stock markets are an alternative source of financing for large loans 
requested by companies. Therefore, one might consider that more developed stock 
markets reduce the potential for syndicated loans in a country, and consequently increase 
the share of bank loans which are not syndicated. Such influence should be even more 
prominent for the development of bond markets, measured with the ratio of private 
domestic debt securities to GDP (Private Bond Markets) and the ratio of public domestic 
debt securities to GDP (Public Bond Markets). Bonds directly compete syndicated loans 
for large financing needs of companies, but this negative influence may also be offset by 
the positive impact of the existence of bond markets, which contribute to increase 
information for participant banks in loan syndicates and therefore limits the adverse 
selection problem in syndicated loans. 
Our second category of country-level variables is for banking regulation. We first 
construct the variable Mincar*Credit Risk, which is the product of the minimum capital 
requirement value and a dummy variable equal to one if the minimum regulatory capital 
ratio varies with bank credit risk. Indeed, what matters for minimum capital requirement 
is as much the existence of such requirements than its implementation. On the one hand, 
we expect a positive coefficient for this variable as the existence of capital requirement 
should contribute to favor the syndication through the motivation of respecting the 
lending limits. This takes into consideration the fact that a stronger requirement increases 
the relevance of this motivation. On the other hand, a negative coefficient can also be 
observed as this capital requirement reduces the number of potential syndication 
participants eligible in terms of adequate capitalization and thus in terms of funding 
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advantages. A supervisory feature is introduced through NPL Definition, a dummy 
variable equal to one if a formal definition of non performing loans exists. If binding, 
such regulatory feature should have a positive influence on syndicate size as it enhances 
transparency on loans portfolio of participant banks. The regulation on lending abroad 
should positively impact syndicate size, as such regulation reduces diversification 
opportunities for domestic banks. We therefore expect that the coefficient of Abroad 
Loan Prohibited, a dummy variable equal to one if abroad loan making is prohibited, 
should be positive, as such prohibitions make syndication more attractive to gain more 
diversified loan portfolios. 
Our third and last category of country-level variables takes legal environment into 
account. Following a large body of research on law and finance pioneered by La Porta et 
al. (1997) and recently completed by Qian and Strahan (2007), legal institutions may 
exert an impact on syndicate structure. Legal risk can  affect the way banks perform their 
governance function, mainly monitoring and re-contracting, and in consequence their 
syndicate structure. Two indicators for legal institutions are included in our estimations. 
Protection of creditor rights is measured with the index provided by La Porta et al. (1998) 
(Creditor Rights). This index is scored on a scale from zero to four with a higher score 
indicating better protection. Law enforcement is measured with the ‘Rule of Law’ index 
also provided by La Porta et al. (1998) (Rule of Law). This indicator ranges from zero to 
ten with a higher score indicating a better enforcement of the law. 
The expected sign of the coefficient for these both variables is ambiguous. Esty 
and Megginson (2003) find that syndicates funding project finance in countries with 
weak creditor rights and poor legal enforcement are larger and more diffuse. Thus, 
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lenders seem to structure the syndicates in order to facilitate re-contracting in countries 
where creditors have strong and enforceable rights. Additionally, better legal protection 
of banks mitigates the moral hazard problem induced by syndicated loans. Indeed, a 
better protection of creditors decreases the need to monitor the borrower, which reduces 
agency problems resulting from the monitoring efforts of banks involved in the syndicate. 
Furthermore, in high legal risk countries, efficient reorganization of a distressed borrower 
might be difficult. Hence, larger syndicate structure are more adapted as they minimize 
hold-up problems in case of reorganization. However, on a more global basis, the agency 
problems resulting from all lending decisions should also be mitigated which may favor 
the choice of a standard loan rather than a syndicated loan for the lead bank. Indeed, the 
motive of the risk-sharing should play a lesser role in well-protected legal environments. 
Hence, monitoring should be more important in the presence of high legal risk (few legal 
rights and low contract enforcement), through a smaller syndicate and/or a larger number 
of arrangers.  
We also control for the number of syndicated loan facilities in a particular country 
through the inclusion of the Syndicated Loan Issues variable. The latter allows 
controlling for the development of the syndicated lending market, which should be 
positively related to the syndicate design. 
3. Syndicated lending in EME, data, and methodology 
This section is devoted to the discussion of the evolution of the syndicated 
lending markets in EME and the presentation of the sample and methodology used in the 
article. 
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3.1 Syndicated lending in EME 
In the third quarter of 200612, Asia (excluding Australasia) is the largest 
syndication market within the emerging economies. It has reached a total amount of 
119.2 billion USD (4.3% of global market) and 549 issues. Middle East and Eastern 
Europe come as second, totaling 50.7 billion USD (1.8% of global market) and 45.2 
billions USD respectively, with 59 and 148 issues. Finally, Central and South America 
has issued 70 deals for a total amount of 30.5 billion USD (1.1% of global market). We 
observe a similar pattern for the syndicated loans volume and issues in Dealscan on 
figure 1.  
- Insert Figure 1 about here – 
We remark an impressive increase of the volume and issues of syndicated loans 
from 1995 to 2005. Asia is by far the greatest market for syndicated loans in emerging 
markets, representing more than half of the volume and issues of syndicated loans for all 
dates. However the other emerging markets have increasing shares in syndicated loans, 
with a particularly fast increase in Central and Eastern Europe. Middle East and Latin 
America are also “catching up”, both syndicated markets being close to 50 billion USD. 
This evolution can be explained by the fact that following financial liberalization, 
spate of privatizations in emerging markets, and economic development funding needs, 
local companies started to displace sovereign borrowers in these regions. However, the 
Asian crisis in 1997 significantly affected financing flows to emerging markets, which 
dropped from 274 billion USD in 1997 to 149 billion USD in 1998. As a consequence, 
foreign syndicated lenders, mostly Japanese banks, restructured their portfolios putting 
                                                 
12 Thomson Financial (2006). 
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large quantities of syndicated loans up for sale in the secondary markets. The Japanese 
stake of the global syndicated loan market corresponding to 10-15%, this withdrawal 
curbed the activity in the market. Following the Russian and the South American crises in 
1998 and 2001 respectively, emerging markets were strongly deprived of syndicated 
lending. 
These observations bring the discussion of the link between syndicated lending 
and financial stability in emerging markets. This link can be investigated by analyzing the 
loan terms obtained by borrowers in IMF-assisted countries following a financial 
instability. For instance, Altunbas et al. (2006) note that syndicated loans in IMF-assisted 
countries are larger but more expensive with shorter maturities. A significant fraction of 
these funds raised on the syndicated loan markets is used for export industry financing 
which places their goods and services sectors at a disadvantage in the export markets. 
Furthermore, more than 25% of syndicated loans are granted to the financial sector. 
These loans have short maturities and their costs is more than twice high as that of loans 
granted to financial institutions in non-assisted countries. Overall, lower growth rates in 
IMF-assisted countries could be explained by the higher cost of funds in the syndicated 
loan markets. 
3.2 Data and methodology 
The sample of syndicated loans comes from the Dealscan database, provided by 
the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC, Reuters). Data concerning financial structure and 
regulatory and supervisory characteristics come from Beck et al. (2000), while data on 
banking regulation come from Barth et al. (2005). Indicators of legal environment come 
from La Porta et al. (1998). Sample size is determined by information availability on the 
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variables used in the regressions. Following Lee and Mullineaux (2004), we use only 
syndicated, completed, and fully confirmed deals, excluding private placements. We 
therefore have a sample of 10,930 loan facilities from 50 emerging countries for the 
period between 1990 and 2006. The frequencies of loan facilities by country are 
displayed in table A.1 in the appendix. 
Following our focus on emerging countries, syndicated loans come from four 
geographical areas13: Asia, Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, and Middle East, 
which account respectively for 70.6%, 12.7%, 9.7%, and 7% of the total number of loan 
facilities in our sample. Therefore, Asia represents almost three quarters of the loans in 
our sample. These shares are in accordance with the relative importance of each 
geographical area on the syndicated loans markets for emerging countries. 
Table 1 lists descriptive statistics for the variables. Tables A.2 and A.3 in the 
appendix provide their definitions and their correlation coefficients respectively.  
- Insert Table 1 about here – 
 We observe that the average syndicate has almost 11 lenders and 3 arrangers14. 
The average loan size is 206,929 million USD with an average maturity of 4,5 years15. 
The covenants are only included in one quarter of loan contracts. The presence of 
guarantors and sponsors is scarcer, being observed in only 8.98% and 9.26% of loan 
contracts respectively. More than half of the loans are senior debt for the lenders. An 
                                                 
13 We do not have any syndicated loans to borrowers from Africa in our sample. 
14 The average size of a bank loan syndicate, measured in terms of number of lenders, is close to 10 in Asia 
and Latin America, while it increases in Central and Eastern Europe (more than 12) and is the most 
important in Middle East (more than 18). The number of arrangers is the lowest in Asia (less than 3), 
average in Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe (close to 4) and large in Middle East (close to 5). 
15 For comparison, from 1987 to 1995 in USA, Lee and Mullineux (2004) have an average number of 
lenders equal to 9, with average loan volume at 221 millions USD and average maturity equal to almost 4 
years. On a more recent time span (1992-2003), Sufi (2007) observes average number of lenders and 
arrangers at 8 and 2 respectively. Average loan is equal to 364 million USD and average maturity is 3 
years. 
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average borrower had 5 syndicated loan facilities during the time span of the sample. On 
average, bank markets are relatively concentrated and rather cost efficient. Stock market 
capitalization is important while the bonds market is rather small.  Non performing loans 
formal definition is quite common, with a minimum capital to assets ratio above 8%. 
Creditor rights and rule of law are in the upper-average.  
 Following Lee and Mullineux (2004), we estimate the following set of individual 
equations using Poisson regressions16: 
Number of Lenders = f(Intercept, Loan characteristics, Banking structure,
Financial development, Regulation and supervision, Legal risk)   
          (1) 
Number of Arrangers = g(Intercept, Loan characteristics, Banking structure,
Financial development, Regulation and supervision, Legal risk)  
          (2)  
4.  Results and discussion 
We perform six series of Poisson regressions, with varying combinations of tested 
factors, for the two individual equations (1) and (2) where the endogenous variables are 
the Number of Lenders and the Number of Arrangers respectively. All regressions 
include the loan characteristics. However, we test alternatively the role of the four 
categories of country-level variables. Namely, while the first set of regressions does not 
include any country-level variable, the four following regressions alternatively add one 
                                                 
16 Poisson regression assumes the data follows a Poisson distribution, which is skewed with non-negative 
and discrete values and variance increasing with the mean. Given the integer nature of the dependent 
variable, this estimation technique is the most appropriate. We do not use negative binomial regressions as 
overdispersion is weak in our sample. Given the skewness of the dependent variables distribution we also 
do not perform OLS regressions, although, as well as Tobit regressions, OLS regressions give qualitatively 
similar results. 
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category of country-level variables to explain the bank’s decision to syndicate a loan. 
Therefore, the second, third, fourth and fifth sets of estimations respectively consider the 
role of banking structure, financial development, banking regulation, and legal risk, on 
the syndicate structure. The last set of estimation includes all of the country level 
variables as a robustness check, as well as to investigate which country level factors are 
the most important determinant of syndicate design.  
- Insert Table 2 about here - 
Results are provided in table 2. All five regressions have satisfactory statistics in 
terms of likelihood ratio Chi-square statistic, as well as in terms of pseudo R², greater 
than 20% and 10% for equations (1) and (2) respectively. 
Loan Size (in logarithm) is positive and significant in all regressions, suggesting 
as expected that larger syndicates, both in terms of total number of lenders and arrangers, 
form around larger loans in accordance with the motives of the diversification of loan 
portfolios and regulatory-driven issues (as in Lee and Mullineux, 2004 and Sufi, 2007). 
The coefficient of Maturity is significantly negative in all estimations of equation (1) and 
significantly positive in most of estimations of equation (2). This finding can be 
explained by the fact that greater maturity strengthens the moral hazard problem through 
higher monitoring costs of the loan as well as by a positive relationship between maturity 
and credit risk (Flannery, 1986; Agbanzo et al., 1998). This finding contrasts with prior 
literature on the USA market and advocates for the specificity of syndicate design in 
emerging markets. 
Among the variables taking into account the reduction of the loan loss in case of 
default, we observe that Senior Debt is almost always negative and significant in all 
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estimations, while Sponsors is negatively and weakly related to the number of arrangers 
only. Guarantors and Covenants are significantly positive in most of estimations of 
equation (1). 
Debt seniority seems to work as an effective protection device for all the lenders, 
leading to smaller syndicates and a lower number of arrangers. The presence of a sponsor 
involved in the funded project leads effectively to a smaller number of arrangers. The 
presence of a guarantor mitigates agency problems resulting from adverse selection, in 
line with the better information owned by the arranger on the borrower, leading to a 
larger syndicate. This result contrasts with Lee and Mullineux (2004) who find 
significant and negative relationship between syndicate size and secured loans. The 
restriction of discretionary power of the borrower through the presence of covenants 
effectively reduces the risk of loan default, and enhance the ability to monitor the 
borrower, thereby reducing the monitoring costs and leading to larger syndicates. 
We also observe that borrower transparency, proxied with the existence of a 
senior debt rating by Standard and Poor’s, has no impact on syndicate structure. This 
finding contrasts with the results obtained by Lee and Mullineux (2004) and Sufi (2007). 
This finding might be driven by the small number of borrowers being rated (less than 
7%) or alternatively, by the fact that syndicate lenders, especially the arrangers, perform 
screening actions within a relationship based framework and external public information 
does not add supplementary elements to reduce borrower opaqueness. Finally, as 
expected, borrower presence is positively related to syndicate design17. 
                                                 
17 Performing our regressions omitting borrowers from Asia as this area account for 70% of our sample and 
might drive our main findings. A vast majority of the results obtained on a smaller sample (close to 3,200 
observations) hold, with a slightly lower level of significance for the loan characteristics which proxy 
lender protection. 
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We now turn to the analysis of the country-level variables. The main finding is 
the significance of most variables. In other words, institutions matter for the syndicate 
structure. All kinds of institutions matter in the sense that we observe significant 
variables for legal risk, financial development, and banking structure and regulation. 
Banking structure clearly matters for the syndicate structure in emerging markets. 
As expected, the cost level of the banking industry exerts a positive impact on the 
syndicate size, both in terms of total number of lenders and arrangers, as the coefficient 
of Overheads is significantly positive. The sharing of administration and origination costs 
encourages the formation of larger syndicates18. Concentration of the banking industry is 
negatively related to the number of lenders forming the syndicate. As expected, greater 
concentration lowers the number of potential participants to join and form a syndicate. 
Also, banks holding greater market shares already benefit from diverse loan portfolios 
and have little incentive to diversify further. The positive and significant sign for this 
factor in equation (2.2) can be explained by the necessity for arrangers to form a larger 
“core” of the syndicate to enhance monitoring of participants who benefit of a 
comfortable market power and therefore might have less incentive to perform their 
monitoring duties in an efficient way. 
Furthermore, the development of bond markets reduces syndicate size as they are 
direct competitors to syndicated loans. Public bonds affect the number of arrangers only, 
which is consistent with the fact that syndicated loans often fund public large public 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
18 Let also note that the mean level of Overheads is relatively low in our sample (less than 5%), therefore 
larger syndicates do not necessarily imply more agency costs as the participating banks do not carry a 
burden of cost-inefficiency that would probably exacerbate the free-riding problems and inefficient 
monitoring. 
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companies as well as local administrations in emerging markets. The development of 
stock markets has no significant impact on syndicate structure19. 
Specifications (1.4) and (2.4) display our results for banking regulation. The 
coefficient of Mincar*Credit Risk is in accordance with the positive influence of a capital 
requirement on the syndicate size in order to respect the lending limits, as a stronger 
requirement increases the impact of this motivation. The coefficient of NPL Definition is 
significant in both specifications but influences positively the number of lenders and 
negatively the number of arrangers. Such regulatory feature seems to enhance bank 
transparency, allowing forming a larger syndicate with fewer arrangers, as problems 
related to informational frictions regarding loans portfolio quality of participants are less 
important. Finally, the regulation on lending abroad positively impacts syndicate size, as 
such regulation reduces diversification opportunities for domestic banks and increase 
their “appetite” to fund a share of a syndicated loan while diversifying their portfolio. 
The results with the legal environment variables are presented with the 
specifications (1.5) and (2.5). We observe that better creditor rights protection has a 
negative and significant influence on the number of lenders whereas it has a positive and 
significant impact on the number of arrangers. A better protection of creditors might 
reduce lenders’ incentives to monitor borrowers and consequently exacerbates free-riding 
problems, which can be tackled through an adapted syndicate structure of small size and 
a larger “core” of arrangers. Let also note that as the other creditors can benefit from such 
protection, monitoring of the borrower by the syndicate must increase to avoid inefficient 
                                                 
19 We also test alternative proxies for financial structure and legal risk. For instance, we replace Stock 
Markets with the ratio of private credit of financial institutions to GDP which can be considered as another 
proxy of the country’s financial structure development. Results from specifications (1.3) and (2.3) are 
robust to this replacement. 
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re-contracting in case of distress. Smaller syndicates with larger cores are more suitable 
for such task. As the quality of institutions increases (i.e. legal risk decreases), the 
number of arrangers diminishes as monitoring is more effective in such legal 
environment. This result is in accordance with the findings of Esty and Megginson 
(2003)20.  
- Insert Table 3 about here - 
Finally, we perform a full estimation taking all of the proxies of country-level 
variables into account21. Results are displayed in table 3. Most of the coefficients remain 
very similar to those obtained in the regressions from table 2. Regarding individual loan 
characteristics, we observe that the presence of financial covenants have a positive and 
significant influence on both the number of lenders and of arrangers, while debt seniority 
is no longer significant for the total size of the syndicate. Bank costs affect positively 
arrangers only while bank market concentration reduces the number of lenders, according 
to the arguments already discussed previously. Private bond markets appear to be the 
only competitor of the syndicated loans market. Bank regulation significantly influences 
the syndicate design, both in terms of lenders and arrangers. Finally, legal risk proxied by 
the credit rights index, influences in a significant and positive manner the number of 
arrangers, according with Esty and Megginson (2003)22. 
                                                 
20 Replacing Rule of Law with alternative proxies from La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) such as Risk of 
Expropriation and Repudiation of Contracts (defined as indexes, scaled from 0 to 10 with lower scores for 
higher risks, assessing the risk of “outright confiscation” or “forced nationalization” and of the ‘‘risk of a 
modification in a contract” respectively) does not affect our results, while these alternative proxies exhibit 
significant and consistent signs. 
21 Due to significant correlations between country-level variables, we drop Stock Markets, Mincar*Credit 
Risk and Syndicated Loan Issues from the regressions. 
22 We also perform all our regressions on a limited sample (less than 2,000 observations) taking borrower’s 
risk characteristics into account through balance sheet ratios from Compustat. Following Sufi (2007), we 
include the following ratios in our regressions : Total Debt to Total Capital, Quick Ratio, Net Income to 
Total Assets, and logarithm of Total Assets. The first two variables are borrower’s risk proxies and affect 
- 27 -  
5. Summary and conclusion 
In this paper, we have investigated the determinants of the syndicate design by 
analyzing the role of loan characteristics following the study design of Lee and 
Mullineaux (2004) on US syndicated loans. Additionally, we examined institutional 
factors inspired by recent literature on the role of institutions on a bank’s loan behavior 
(Esty and Megginson, 2003; Qian and Strahan, 2007).  
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, we have provided 
evidence to explain the role of several loan characteristics in the structure of bank 
syndicates funding loans to borrowers from emerging markets. 
Second, we have shown that institutions influence the syndicate structure. Indeed 
we undoubtedly found that banking structure, financial development, banking regulation, 
and legal environment exert an impact on the syndicate size.  
Third, the observed impact of tested variables suggests the prominence of certain 
motives for the formation of syndicates with adapted structure. Syndicates are structured 
in order to minimize agency problems related to loan characteristics and country 
financial, regulatory and institutional environment. The numbers of lenders and  
arrangers increase with loan size but are not affected by borrower’s transparency. The 
overall size of the syndicate increases with covenants and guarantor presence. It 
decreases with debt seniority as well as with loan maturity, while the latter positively 
affects the number of arrangers. More costly banking industry involves larger syndicates 
                                                                                                                                                 
mostly the number of arrangers in a consistent manner, with positive coefficients as riskier borrowers imply 
greater agency costs for the syndicate. The third variable proxy profitability and is positively related to the 
number of arrangers. The last variable allows to control for borrower size and has a positive and significant 
influence on the number of arrangers. Except the size, all other borrower’s risk proxies variables do not 
have significant impact on the number of lenders. Our main results regarding the significance and the sign 
of the loan characteristics and country-level factors remain unaffected. 
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while more concentrated banking industry reduces the number of lenders. Financial 
development, in particular bonds markets, affects negatively the size of the syndicate. 
Bank capital and banking activities regulation, as well as loan portfolio transparency,  
have a positive impact on syndicate size. Finally, syndicates are structured in a consistent 
manner in order to mitigate legal risk. These main findings are robust to sample, proxy 
variables and estimation methods used in the regressions. 
Overall, the structures of syndicates are adapted to enhance monitoring of the 
borrower and to increase the efficiency of re-contracting process in case of borrower's 
distress. Main syndication motives, such as loans portfolio diversification, regulatory 
pressure and management costs reduction, also influence syndicate structure in emerging 
markets. 
Our analysis can be extended in a number of ways. An important input to 
understand syndication process would be to include borrowers and lenders characteristics 
into regressions explaining the syndication process (following Altunbas et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, the formation of syndicates, its heterogeneity and dynamics, as well as its 
dependence upon business cycles, industrial sectors and geographic areas, should be 
more deeply investigated. Ultimately, empirical knowledge regarding “who syndicates 
with whom” and the factors influencing this process should be empirically modelled, 
using more developed econometric techniques. Finally, due to its specific nature of mixed 
finance, merging relationship based and transaction based lending, a closer look at the 
advantages in terms of information production (hard versus soft) and the motivations and 
drawbacks of forming and entering into a syndicate should be performed, both within 
theoretical and empirical settings. 
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Figure 1 Evolution of syndicated loans volume (in billion USD) and syndicated 
loans issues from 1995 to 2005 in emerging markets economies (source: author 
calculations on Dealscan database).  
CEE : Central and Eastern Europe,  EME : Emerging Markets Economies. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics for the sample 
The table below provides descriptive statistics computed on our dataset of loan facilities. 
Definition of variables appears in table A.1 in the appendix. Std.dev. : standard deviation, Min.: 
minimum, Max.: maximum. 
Variable Sample size Mean Std. dev. Min. Max
Number of Lenders 10,930 11.2983 8.1207 2.0000 78.0000
Number of Arrangers 8,747 3.0388 2.9404 1.0000 32.0000
Loan Size 10,930 206,929 903,528 0,022 81,078,450
Maturity 10,930 54.3310 39.1371 1.0000 600.0000
S&P Rating 10,930 0.0673 0.2506 0.0000 1.0000
Guarantors 10,930 0.0898 0.2858 0.0000 1.0000
Sponsors 10,930 0.0926 0.2899 0.0000 1.0000
Covenants 10,930 0.2436 0.4293 0.0000 1.0000
Senior Debt 10,930 0.5270 0.4993 0.0000 1.0000
Borrower Presence 10,930 5.0209 5.8614 1 36
Syndicated Loans Issues 10,930 795.7952 552.3781 9 1515
Overheads 10,207 0.0327 0.0217 0.0063 0.1418
Concentration 10,219 0.5610 0.1843 0.2493 1.0000
Stock Market 10,084 0.8976 1.0102 0.0021 4.9921
Private Bonds Market 8,646 0.1720 0.1524 0.0003 0.5570
Public Bonds Market 9,150 0.1563 0.1219 0.0033 0.5375
Credit Risk 9,127 0.1688 0.3746 0.0000 1.0000
Mincar 9,150 8.6874 1.3679 8.0000 12.0000
Solvency 8,699 0.7021 0.4573 0.0000 1.0000
NPL Definition 9,131 0.6746 0.4685 0.0000 1.0000
Abroad Loan Prohibited 9,150 0.4099 0.4919 0.0000 1.0000
Creditor Rights 8,724 2.7727 1.2614 0.0000 4.0000
Rule of Law 8,724 6.3505 1.8141 1.9000 8.5700
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Table 2 Estimations (1/2) 
Poisson regression results taking bank market structure, financial development, bank regulation and legal risk into account respectively. The dependent variables are Number of 
Lenders and Number of Arrangers (equations 1 and 2 respectively), equal to the number of lenders and arrangers forming the syndicate. Definitions of variables appear in table 
A.1 in the appendix. Dummy variables for loan type (Term and Revolver), loan purpose (General Corporate, Debt Repayment, Working Capital, Project Finance), benchmark rate 
(Libor, Euribor), year, region, industry sector, and loan facility active date are included in the regressions but are not reported. Robust standard errors clustered at the borrower 
level in brackets. ***, **, and * correspond to coefficients significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
Specification  (1.1) (2.1) (1.2) (2.2) (1.3) (2.3) (1.4) (2.4) (1.5) (2.5) 
Endogenous variable Number of 
Lenders 
Number of 
Arrangers 
Number of 
Lenders 
Number of 
Arrangers 
Number of 
Lenders 
Number of 
Arrangers 
Number of 
Lenders 
Number of 
Arrangers 
Number of 
Lenders 
Number of 
Arrangers 
-5.3215*** -6.7571*** -5.2691*** -7.0675*** -3.2669*** -7.0578*** -5.1780*** -6.8716*** -5.0564*** -6.9609*** Intercept 
(0.7539) (1.1282) (0.8655) (1.5027) (0.8318) (1.6453) (0.9069) (1.4572) (0.8321) (1.2306) 
0.3368*** 0.3131*** 0.3463*** 0.3141*** 0.3524*** 0.3296*** 0.3420*** 0.2938*** 0.3525*** 0.3289*** Log(Loan Size) 
(0.0090) (0.0148) (0.0098) (0.0153) (0.0099) (0.0169) (0.0100) (0.0164) (0.0100) (0.0166) 
-0.0015*** 0.0010** -0.0015*** 0.0013*** -0.0012*** 0.0007 -0.0016*** 0.0011*** -0.0010*** 0.0011** Maturity 
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
0.0186 0.0585 0.0064 0.0625 -0.0181 0.0674 0.0200 0.0803 0.0073 0.0573 S&P Rating 
(0.0279) (0.0490) (0.0286) (0.0503) (0.0267) (0.0515) (0.0314) (0.0550) (0.0298) (0.0523) 
0.0466** 0.0068 0.0489** -0.0052 0.0467** -0.0271 0.0638*** -0.0052 0.0327 -0.0029 Guarantors 
(0.0218) (0.0380) (0.0231) (0.0387) (0.0238) (0.0425) (0.0231) (0.0401) (0.0250) (0.0431) 
0.0050 -0.0729* -0.0021 -0.0757* -0.0253 -0.0614 -0.0004 -0.0854** -0.0253 -0.0708 Sponsors 
(0.0264) (0.0421) (0.0275) (0.0420) (0.0269) (0.0468) (0.0289) (0.0431) (0.0288) (0.0468) 
0.0554** -0.0246 0.0426* -0.0216 0.0671** -0.0248 0.0442* 0.0641 0.0572** 0.0214 Covenants 
(0.0246) (0.0429) (0.0195) (0.0430) (0.0259) (0.0483) (0.0264) (0.0433) (0.0285) (0.0473) 
-0.1147*** -0.1598*** -0.1164*** -0.1475** -0.0344 -0.1924*** -0.0976*** -0.1137** -0.1444*** -0.2197*** Senior Debt 
(0.0321) (0.0572) (0.03456) (0.0575) (0.0358) (0.0652) (0.0346) (0.0597) (0.0398) (0.0673) 
0.0045** 0.0097*** 0.0041** 0.0104*** 0.0053** 0.0102*** 0.0059*** 0.0081** 0.0039** 0.0090*** Borrower Presence 
(0.0019) (0.0033) (0.0020) (0.0033) (0.0022) (0.0036) (0.0019) (0.0033) (0.0019) (0.0033) 
0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0000 0.0001* 0.0002*** 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002*** Syndicated Loans Issues 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
- - 
(0.0001) (0.0001) 
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(Table 2 continued) 
Specification  (1.1) (2.1) (1.2) (2.2) (1.3) (2.3) (1.4) (2.4) (1.5) (2.5) 
Endogenous variable Number of 
Lenders 
Number of 
Arrangers 
Number of 
Lenders 
Number of 
Arrangers 
Number of 
Lenders 
Number of 
Arrangers 
Number of 
Lenders 
Number of 
Arrangers 
Number of 
Lenders 
Number of 
Arrangers 
2.4280*** 4.6426*** Overheads - - 
(0.6556) (0.7956) 
- - - - - - 
-0.1430*** 0.2115** Concentration - - 
(0.0519) (0.0836) 
- -  - - - - 
-0.0072 0.0177 Stock Markets - - - - 
(0.0094) (0.0166) 
- - - - 
-0.6745*** -0.0615 Private Bond Markets - - - - 
(0.0822) (0.1403) 
- - - - 
0.1332 -0.5598*** Public Bond Markets - - - - 
(0.1120) (0.1771) 
- - - - 
0.0058* -0.0023 Mincar*Credit Risk - - - - - - 
(0.0034) (0.0048) 
- - 
0.1757*** -0.1441*** NPL Definition - - - - - - 
(0.0212) (0.0354) 
- - 
0.1271*** 0.0249 Abroad Loan Prohibited - - - - - - 
(0.0220) (0.0365) 
- - 
-0.0252** 0.0750*** Creditor Rights - - - - - - - - 
(0.0105) (0.0177) 
-0.0017 -0.0447*** Rule of Law - - - - - - - - 
(0.0067) (0.0095) 
N 10,930 8,747 10,207 8,342 8,376 7,101 9,108 7,265 8,724 7,144 
LR Chi2 22,159.64*** 5,022.06*** 21,551.19*** 5,039.51*** 14,575.64*** 3,955.59*** 19,476.18*** 3,974.18*** 18,803.15*** 4,227.11*** 
Pseudo R² 0.2242 0.1192 0.2323 0.1253 0.2106   0.1189 0.2358 0.1168 0.2403 0.1252 
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Table 3 Estimations (2/2) 
Poisson regression results taking all of country-level variables into account (due to 
significant correlations, some of the country-level variables are dropped).. The 
dependent variables are Number of Lenders and Number of Arrangers (equations 1 and 
2 respectively), equal to the number of lenders and arrangers forming the syndicate. 
Definitions of variables appear in table A.1 in the appendix. Dummy variables for loan 
type (Term and Revolver), loan purpose (General Corporate, Debt Repayment, Working 
Capital, Project Finance), benchmark rate (Libor, Euribor), year, region, industry sector, 
and loan facility active date are included in the regressions but are not reported. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the borrower level in brackets. ***, **, and * correspond to 
coefficients significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
Specification  (1.6) (2.6) 
Endogenous variable Number of Lenders Number of Arrangers 
-1.013 -7.0200*** Intercept 
(1.0335) (1.8680) 
0.3583*** 0.3152*** Log(Loan Size) 
(0.0127) (0.0197) 
-0.0009*** 0.0010*** Maturity 
(0.0003) (0.0004) 
-0.0196 0.0863 S&P Rating 
(0.0316) (0.0621) 
0.0629** -0.0339 Guarantors 
(0.0280) (0.0489) 
-0.0316 -0.0534 Sponsors 
(0.0331) (0.0493) 
0.0655** 0.1263*** Covenants 
(0.0291) (0.0487) 
-0.0515 -0.1821** Senior Debt 
(0.0425) (0.0757) 
0.0059** 0.0040 Borrower Presence 
(0.0023) (0.0036) 
-2.5744 5.1474*** Overheads 
(1.3878) (1.4067) 
-0.1899** -0.2265 Concentration 
(0.0800) (0.1227) 
-0.4844*** -1.1272*** Private Bond Markets 
(0.1333) (0.2668) 
-0.1576 -0.2528 Public Bond Markets 
(0.1375) (0.1942) 
0.2186*** -0.6026*** NPL Definition 
(0.0526) (0.0941) 
0.2044*** -0.1151** Abroad Loan Prohibited 
(0.0342) (0.0543) 
0.0059 0.0624** Creditor Rights 
(0.0142) (0.0256) 
-0.0114 0.0326 Rule of Law 
(0.0103) (0.0178) 
N 6,028 5,051 
LR Chi2 10,341.07*** 3,030.53*** 
Pseudo R² 0.2114 0.1318 
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Table A.1 Frequencies of loan facilities by country 
The table below provides frequencies (N) of loan facilities by country for the 
full sample. 
Country N Country N 
United Arab Emirates 62 Latvia 23 
Argentina 208 Mexico 429 
Azerbaijan 14 Malaysia 314 
Bulgaria 26 Oman 40 
Bahrain 61 Pakistan 38 
Brazil 278 Panama 38 
Chile 211 Peru 47 
China 661 Philippines 219 
Colombia 75 Poland 119 
Czech Republic 72 Qatar 37 
Egypt 66 Romania 44 
Estonia 19 Russia 313 
Guatemala 18 Saudi Arabia 64 
Hong Kong 1,372 Singapore 366 
Croatia 58 El Salvador 11 
Hungary 133 Slovakia 40 
Indonesia 790 Slovenia 62 
India 404 Thailand 582 
Iran 24 Trinidad and Tobago 13 
Israel 28 Turkey 344 
Kazakhstan 85 Taiwan 1,515 
Korea 1,42 Ukraine 35 
Kuwait 40 Uruguay 9 
Sri Lanka 9 Venezuela 53 
Lithuania 15 Vietnam 26 
  Total 10,930 
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Table A.2 Brief description of all variables and their sources 
Variable Description Source 
Loan contract characteristics 
Number of Lenders Number of lenders in the syndicate. Dealscan 
Number of Arrangers Number of arrangers in the syndicate. Dealscan 
Loan Size Size of the loan in million USD. Dealscan 
Maturity Maturity of the loan in months Dealscan 
S&P Rating =1 if the borrower has a senior debt rating by 
Standard & Poor’s 
 
Guarantors =1 if there is at least one guarantor Dealscan 
Covenants =1 if the loan agreement includes covenants Dealscan 
Senior Debt =1 if debt is senior Dealscan 
Borrower Presence Number of times a particular borrower is 
present in the sample 
Dealscan 
Control variables 
Term Loan =1 if the loan is a term loan Dealscan 
Revolver =1 if the loan is a revolving bank facility Dealscan 
Corporate Purposes =1 if the loan purpose is general corporate 
purposes funding 
Dealscan 
Debt Repayment =1 if the loan purpose is debt repayment 
funding 
Dealscan 
Working Capital =1 if the loan purpose is working capital 
funding 
Dealscan 
Project Finance =1 if the loan purpose is project finance 
funding 
Dealscan 
Libor =1 if the benchmark rate is Libor Dealscan 
Euribor =1 if the benchmark rate is Euribor Dealscan 
Country characteristics 
Syndicated Loan Issues Number of syndicated loan facilities in a 
particular country 
Dealscan 
Overheads Ratio of banking overhead costs to total 
banking assets 
Beck et al. (2000) 
Concentration Assets of the three largest banks as a share 
of total banking assets 
Beck et al. (2000) 
Stock Markets Value of listed shares to GDP Beck et al. (2000) 
Private Bond Markets Public domestic debt securities to GDP Beck et al. (2000) 
Public Bond Markets Private domestic debt securities to GDP Beck et al. (2000) 
Mincar Minimum capital requirement value Barth et al. (2005) 
Credit Risk =1 if the minimum regulatory capital ratio 
varies with bank credit risk 
Barth et al. (2005) 
NPL Definition =1 if a formal definition of non-performing 
loans exists 
Barth et al. (2005) 
Abroad Loan Prohibited =1 if banks are prohibited from granting 
loans abroad 
Barth et al. (2005) 
Creditor rights An index aggregating four aspects of creditor 
rights. The index ranges from zero (weak 
creditor rights) to four (strong creditor rights) 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
Rule of Law An index indicating the law enforcement. The 
index ranges from zero (weak enforcement) 
to ten (strong enforcement) 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
 4
Table A.3 Loan and country characteristics variables correlation coefficients 
 Loan 
size 
Maturity S&P Rating Guarantors Sponsors Covenants Senior 
Debt 
Borrower 
Presence 
Loan size 1.00        
Maturity 0.13*** 1.00       
S&P Rating 0.01 0.02 1.00      
Guarantors -0.00 -0.03** -0.05*** 1.00     
Sponsors -0.01 -0.01 -0.02** -0.04*** 1.00    
Covenants 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.01 -0.02* 0.00 1.00   
Senior Debt 0.06*** -0.03*** 0.03*** -0.03*** 0.02* 0.46*** 1.00  
Borrower Presence 0.03*** -0.06*** 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 1.00 
 
 Syndicated 
Loan 
Issues 
Overheads Concentration Stock 
Markets 
Private 
Bond 
Markets 
Public 
Bond 
Markets 
Abroad 
Loan 
Prohibited 
Mincar Credit 
Risk 
NPL 
Definition 
Creditor 
Rights 
Rule of 
Law 
Syndicated 
Loan Issues 
1.00            
Overheads -0.39*** 1.00           
Concentration -0.29*** 0.05*** 1.00          
Stock Markets 0.44*** -0.12*** 0.20*** 1.00         
Private Bond 
Markets 
0.55*** -0.36*** -0.45*** 0.15*** 1.00        
Public Bond 
Markets 
-0.29*** 0.08*** -0.22*** -0.06*** 0.22*** 1.00       
Abroad Loan 
Prohibited 
0.89*** -0.37*** -0.44*** 0.12*** 0.51*** -0.19*** 1.00      
Mincar -0.45*** 0.37*** 0.17*** 0.09*** -0.18*** 0.14*** -0.42*** 1.00     
Credit Risk -0.40*** 0.51*** 0.21*** -0.24*** -0.38*** 0.16*** -0.36*** 0.03*** 1.00    
NPL Definition -0.21*** 0.04*** -0.10*** 0.40*** -0.37*** 0.31*** -0.11*** 0.13*** -0.02** 1.00   
Creditor 
Rights 
0.23*** -0.48*** 0.34*** 0.40*** 0.09*** -0.28*** 0.20*** -0.14*** -0.66*** -0.11*** 1.00  
Rule of Law 0.53*** -0.29*** 0.03*** 0.67*** 0.29*** 0.08*** 0.17*** 0.12*** -0.32*** 0.25*** 0.15*** 1.00 
***, **, and * correspond to coefficients significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
